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Abstract
Crowdsourcing contests provide an effective way to
elicit novel ideas and creative solutions from collective
intelligence. A key design feature of crowdsourcing
contests is the competition between contest participants
to complete a specific task with financial awards to the
winner(s). In recent years, some crowdsourcing contest
platforms provide options to contest participants for
solution sharing during the competition. This study
intends to evaluate the influence of exposure to shared
solutions on different stakeholders, including the team,
and the requester. Our study employs a multiple-level
panel data from a large online crowdsourcing platform,
Kaggle.com, to examine these effects. For teams,
exposure to shared solutions helps new entrant teams to
jump-start and help teams to achieve better
performance in the subsequent submissions, and the
teams’ skill level negatively moderates these positive
effects. For requesters, allowing solution sharing has
both benefits and costs in terms of improving the best
performance of the crowd. We highlight the theoretical
implications of the study and provide practical
suggestions for crowdsourcing contest platforms to help
them decide whether to allow solution sharing during
the competition.

1. Introduction
Crowdsourcing contests have become more and
more attractive for organizations to generate ideas and
solve problems because of the unprecedented scale and
diversified background of the labor pool they provide
[1]. An increasing number of organizations, including
governments (e.g., Health and Human Services
Department), research institutes (e.g., NASA), large
enterprises (e.g., General Electric, LG), have started to
employ crowdsourcing contests to enable their research
and development process1.
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Online crowdsourcing contest platforms facilitate
access to a large labor pool and provide an easily
accessible and efficient way for companies to obtain
ideas and/or solutions [2]. To attract more participants
and achieve better crowdsourcing outcomes,
crowdsourcing contest platforms explore ways in an
attempt to lower entry barriers and reduce participation
costs for contestants. For example, kaggle.com, the
largest crowdsourcing platform focusing on data
science-related problems, provides a mechanism that
allows participants to share their intermediary solutions
during the contest. To motivate contestants to share
high-quality solutions, Kaggle awards the authors of
popular shared solutions. During the competition, the
contestants take shared solutions as a benchmark or
inspiration to aid their innovations [2]. To come up with
solutions, contestants first search over the solution space
in the exploration stage. For example, when contestants
first join a competition, they explore the task
requirement specified by the requesters and explore all
the existing solutions either provided by other solvers or
provided outside the platform. Then in the exploitation
stage, they exploit the most promising area found in the
exploration stage. Allowing solution sharing may cause
contestants to shift their effort from exploring new
directions independently to exploiting the shared
solutions.
From the exploitation perspective, using shared
solutions helps contestants gain the required skill and
knowledge quickly and boost their performance [3].
Meanwhile, contestants can allocate more time to the
critical components of the solution because they do not
need to duplicate effort on reinventing the basic
components. As a result, the final solution could be
improved. In a way, that is how society has progressed
by building upon shared knowledge.
From the exploration perspective, allowing solution
sharing may also have some unintended effects. For
example, allowing solution sharing may disincentivize
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contestants
from
exploring
new
directions
independently. One of the primary goals of high-skilled
contestants for innovation is to win the award/prize with
the minimum effort. To economize their effort level,
contestants may shift the effort from exploring new
directions to exploiting the existing shared solutions.
Shared solutions may cause contestants to think inside
the boundary set by existing solutions, which is
detrimental in the innovation process. The above
discussions suggest that there are tradeoffs in allowing
solution sharing for different stakeholders. The
consequence of solution sharing is still unclear.
This study intends to evaluate the influence of
solution sharing in crowdsourcing contests on different
stakeholders, including the participating teams and the
requester, which initiates the contest. Specifically, we
address the following research questions:
1. How does exposure to shared solutions
influence the performance of participating teams at
different skill levels?
2. How does exposure to shared solutions
influence participating teams’ parallel path effect and
the contest outcomes?
We find that solution sharing is overall beneficial
for the crowdsourcing platform, the requester, and the
teams. For participating teams, solution sharing helps
new entrant teams to jump-start and helps existing teams
to achieve better performance during the contests. Lowskilled teams benefit more from solution sharing
functionality. For requesters, allowing solution sharing
has both benefits and costs in terms of improving the
best performance of the crowd. The findings have
important implications for crowdsourcing contest
platforms.

2. Hypotheses Development
2.1 Impact of Solution Sharing on Teams’
First-Submission Performance
When new entrant teams, which are inexperienced
in a contest, are exposed to the shared solutions, they
can learn from these shared solutions to gain the
required skills and domain knowledge [4]-[5]. The
learning behavior is similar to exploitation in solution
search literature [6]-[7]. Exploitation here means that
contestants can exploit the promising intermediary
solutions shared by others. Exploiting existing
knowledge helps individuals to get workable solutions
[8], have more innovative [9], and more effective
solutions [10], and achieve more secure performance
outcomes [11]. When the number of shared solutions is
bigger, new entrant teams to a contest can learn more to
boost their first-submission performance.

It is worth noting that the positive effect of shared
solutions on teams’ first-submission performance might
be heterogeneous for teams at different skill levels. For
high-skilled teams, they may benefit less from learning
from the shared solutions. Because they already
mastered the required skills and domain knowledge to
start the contest independently, and/or shared solutions
may hinder these teams from thinking beyond the
boundary set by these shared solutions, which is called
‘adverse fixation effect’ in the innovation literature
(e.g., [12]-[14]). Therefore, the high-skilled teams will
benefit less from shared solutions to jump-start their
first-submission performance.
H1a. The number of shared solutions in a contest
improves the teams’ first-submission performance (i.e.,
the performance of the new entrant teams to a contest).
H1b. The lower the skill level of new entrant teams, the
greater the effect of shared solutions on the teams’ firstsubmission performance.

2.2. Impact of Solution Sharing on Teams’
Subsequent Performance
Teams can broaden their skill sets and improve their
solutions during the contest through observational
learning from the shared solutions. Teams who have low
performance in the contest have much space to improve
by learning from shared solutions. However, highperformance teams in a contest are less likely to keep
improving their performance through learning because
they already have outstanding performance compared
with their peers. At the same time, the fixation effects
influence high-skilled teams more because they have the
required skills to come up with high-quality solutions if
they think independently. When the high-skilled teams
learn from the solutions proposed by others, they may
get stuck by the shared solutions and/or they may
incorporate some inappropriate (even detrimental)
features in their own solutions unintentionally [15].
Therefore exposure to shared solutions may benefit
high-skilled teams less compared with average-skilled
teams during the competition.
H2a. The number of solutions used by teams has a
positive effect on their subsequent solution
performance. H2b. The lower the teams’ historical
performance in a contest, the greater the positive effect
of solution usage on their subsequent solution
performance.

2.3. Impact of Solution Sharing on the Bestperformance of the Crowd
Parallel path effects predict when teams develop
solutions independently and parallelly, the increased
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number of teams leads to a higher chance that the
contest might get an exceptionally high-quality solution
[16] – [21]. In our study, the data science task (e.g.,
finding dark matter in the universe) is highly
complicated and uncertain, and this high uncertainty
amplifies the parallel path effects [21]. So adding more
teams increases the chance that the requester gets an
exceptionally high-quality solution.
During the contest, exposure to solutions shared by
others helps high-skilled teams to come up with
revolutionary creative solutions. First, when teams work
on high-quality shared solutions as benchmarks, they
can save time from duplicating the basic components of
the same task and use these saved time to work on the
critical components of the task. Second, when teams can
observe multiple shared solutions, they have a decent
chance of finding superior solutions that provide them
with perspectives from a new angle. Jeppesen and
Lakhani [22] empirically found that the provision of
winning solutions is positively related to the distance
between the solver’s expertise and the focal field of the
problem. The rationale behind this phenomenon is that
when the current direction of the solution does not work,
having a perspective outside the current field domain
may help to generate an effective solution. From this
perspective, exposure to the existing superior solutions
shared by others with different skillsets may help teams
to have alternative perspectives. Thirdly, teams can
compare their solutions with the existing shared
solutions and then reflect and revise their own solutions.
This reflection process is essential in experiential
learning.
However, shared solutions may hinder the
independent revolutionary thinking of creative teams
and make them conform to shared solutions. Bestperformance solutions, which beat all other solutions,
are likely to be revolutionary creative solutions. When
exposed to the shared solutions, the high-skilled teams
who have the potential to come up with these bestperformance solutions might be more vulnerable to the
fixation effects. For these highly creative teams, being
exposed to solutions shared by others may trigger
conformity effects and hinder them from proposing
extremely creative solutions [13]. After being exposed
to shared solutions, these shared solutions are
involuntarily retrieved in mind and cannot be
deliberately rejected [13]. To sum up, the shared
solutions may attenuate the parallel path effects because
the shared solutions may discourage the most creative
teams from thinking independently.
H3a. The number of teams increases the best
solution performance of all teams (i.e., the parallel path
effects). H3b. The number of shared solutions increases
the best solution performance of all teams. H3c. The

more the shared solutions, the smaller the effect of the
number of teams on the best solution performance.

3. Research Context and Data
Our study employs a multiple-level panel data from
a large online crowdsourcing platform, Kaggle.com, to
examine the effects of solution sharing on different
stakeholders. Kaggle is a crowdsourcing contest
platform, which allows requesters to post contests and
seek solutions for their data science tasks. There are
multiple reasons why we chose Kaggle as our research
context. First, Kaggle provides ‘kernel’ functionality to
encourage contestants to share solutions during the
contest. ‘Kaggle kernel’ means shared scripts/IPython
Notebooks/R Markdown, combining the programming
environment, input, code, and output. Contestants can
share the intermediary solutions by making their kernels
public. The shared kernels are available to all teams.
Kaggle tries to use the kernel function to help
contestants to manage and share their data science work.
Second, Kaggle provides a well-organized and daily
updated archival dataset (i.e., Meta Kaggle), enabling
scholars to examine the effects of exposure to shared
solutions at multiple levels empirically.
Until Nov 2019 (the time we got our data), Kaggle
has held 360 different public contests since its launch.
In our study, we only include 237 contests that provide
a monetary reward. We exclude the contests held for
new contestants in Kaggle for educational purposes,
consistent with previous studies [23]. In the Kaggle
contests, solutions are submitted based on teams, and
the majority teams are single-member teams. Each
contest gives the upper bound of the number of team
members.

4. Variables, Model Specification and
Results
Our analysis is at different levels, including contest
level and team level. To quantify the impact of solution
sharing on different stakeholders, we aggregate the
team-level panel data to contest level to test our H1 and
H3, and we use the single-member-team-level analysis
to test our H2. We employ the fixed effects as our main
identification strategies for all analyses, including the
team-specific and contest-specific fixed effects. These
fixed effects help us account for average differences
across teams and contests in any observable or
unobservable predictors, such as the team’s job
experience and contest complexity.
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4.1. Impact of Solution Sharing on Team’s First-

Submission Performance
To examine how the shared solutions help new
entrant teams to get better performance, we only
consider the first submission of each team, and our
analysis is at the contest-day level. More specifically,
we aggregate the team-level first submission
performance to the contest level to study how the
number of shared solutions available before teams
submit their first solution influences these teams’ firstsubmission performance. During the time window of the
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡 =

analysis, each contest attracts 13 teams on average per
day (the Std. Dev. is 22.2). In our analysis, we aggregate
the performance of all teams’ first-submission solutions
of a contest on the same day by using the daily average
performance scores. To ensure that new entrant teams’
daily performance scores are comparable across
different contests, we calculate the normalized
performance scores. Specifically, we use Equation 1 to
calculate the normalized average daily performance
scores of teams’ first-submission solutions. The
normalized performance scores are independent of the
contest.

𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡 −𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗,𝑡=1…𝑇 )
𝜎𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒

× 1(𝑗)

(1)

𝑗,𝑡=1…𝑇

, where 𝑗 indexes contest 𝑗, 𝑡 denotes time 𝑡, and 1(∙) is the indicator function, and the definition of this indicator
function is:
1 𝑖𝑓 performance 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑
1(𝑗) = {
−1 𝑖𝑓 performance 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑
results. For instance, if experienced team leaders
There are different types of evaluation metrics,
strategically wait until the end to submit their solutions
including the accuracy type and error rate type. In the
(e.g., [25]), these teams are more likely to have better
accuracy type of metrics, the high-performance score
performance no matter they can learn from the shared
represents high performance. However, in the error rate
solutions or not.
type of metrics, the smaller score represents better
To account for the timing strategy mentioned
performance. Here we use an indicator function to
above, we control for the time elapsed (TimeElapsedj,t )
ensure that the high normalized performance score
of a contest and the average quality of team leaders in
represents high performance.
our analysis. The time elapsed is measured by the
We use the performance in the private leaderboard
percentage of contest time elapsed since the start
to measure the team’s first-submission performance.
divided by the contest’s total duration [24]. The
Kaggle calculates the public score by a relatively small
measurement of the average quality of team leaders of
portion of the holdout set (e.g., 10%) and calculates the
new entrant teams includes the 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑡 and
private leaderboard by a more substantial portion of the
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑡 .
holdout set (e.g., 90%). We use the performance in the
Further, we control the contest-specific fixed
public leaderboard as the robustness check, and the
effects to address systematic contest differences that are
results are consistent. The variable of interest is the
invariant over time. Failure to control for these contestnumber of solutions available at time t-1 (i.e.,
specific characteristics may lead to the spurious
KernelNumj,t−1 ). We also control for the number of
correlation between exposure to shared solutions and
posts in the forum (ForumPostNumj,t−1 ) at t-1. Note
team performance. For example, suppose some
that
using
variables
KernelNumj,t−1
and
attractive contests (e.g., contests with the higher budget)
draw more high-skilled entrants and shared solutions
ForumPostNumj,t−1 effectively address the potential
simultaneously. In that case, the regression results will
concern of reverse causality.
be biased without controlling the contest-specific fixed
Teams may show strategic behavior during the
effects.
competition. For example, teams exert more effort
We specify our model as Equation 2 to test our H1
toward the end of the competition to avoid submission
and
present
the definition and the summary statistics of
wars [24]. High-quality teams will submit their
the
variables
in Panel A of Table 1. We log-transformed
solutions later than inexperienced ones, and highsome
of
our
independent
variables due to the high data
quality teams are less likely to enter tasks when a highskewness [33].
quality solution has already been submitted [25]. Failure
to account for these timing strategies may bias our
Table 1 Variables Used to Test H1 and H3 (Contest-level Analysis)
Dependent Variable

Panel A: Variables Used to Test H1 (Contest-Day Level)
N

mean

sd

min

max
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𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑁𝐸𝑗𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑁𝐸𝑗𝑡
Variable of Interest
𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1
Control Variables
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑡
Dependent Variable
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡
Variable of Interest
𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡
𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡

The normalized average score of new entrant teams’ first
submissions in contest j on day t in the public leaderboard
(only used in the robustness check)
The normalized average score of new entrant teams’ first
submissions in contest j on day t in the private leaderboard

12630

0.000

0.992

-12.04

8.460

12450

0.000

0.993

-12.04

8.481

The number of shared solutions in contest j on or before t − 1

15753

107.6

244.0

0

2611

15753
The number of available posts in the forum of contest j on or
before t − 1
15753
The percentage of contest (j) time elapsed as of current day t
The percent of new entrant teams’ leaders without contest
13178
experience in contest j on day t
The average historical contest rank percentile of the leaders of
10860
new entrant teams’ in contest j on day t
Panel B: Variables Used to Test H3 (Contest-Week Level)

68.91

86.71

0

648

0.508
0.548

0.289
0.297

0.00143
0

1
1

0.429

0.145

0.00152

1

Normalized best performance score of all teams in contest j at
or before week t in the public leaderboard (only used in the
robustness check)
Normalized best performance score of all teams in contest j at
or before week t in the private leaderboard

845

0.000

0.697

-2.474

2.153

860

0.000

.695

-2.341

2.171

The number of teams in contest j at or before week t
The number of shared kernels in contest j at or before week t

860
860

1087.6
247.6

1176.6
339.1

16
0

8491
2528

𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑁𝐸𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽 × ln(𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 +
1) + 𝛽 × ln(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 + 1) + 𝛽 ×
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽 × 𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑁𝐸𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼𝑗 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡 (2)
Table 2 the Impact of Solution Sharing on New Entrants’
Performance
Model
DV
ln(𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 + 1)

(1)
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑁𝐸𝑗𝑡
0.0968*
(0.0509)
0.124**
ln(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 + 1)
(0.0620)
-0.531***
ln(𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑡 + 1)
(0.0871)
-1.158***
ln(𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑡 + 1)
(0.124)
0.0604
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡
(0.114)
Constant
-0.166
(0.162)
Observations
10,687
R-squared
0.040
Number of Contests
212
Contest FE
YES
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1;

supporting our H1a. Our results indicate when the
number of shared solutions increases by 10%, the newentrant teams’ normalized performance would increase
by 1%. For requesters in the crowdsourcing contest,
they care more about the daily best-performance. To this
end, we also examine the effect of shared solutions on
the daily best performance across all first-submission
solutions in the robustness check section. Similarly, the
number of shared solutions is positively related to the
daily best performance across all first-submission
solutions.
After examining the effect of exposure to shared
solutions on the team’s first-submission performance,
we are still interested in whether this effect is different
across the contestants with different qualities. We
leverage the regression quantile method proposed by
Machado and Santos Silva [26] to examine this
heterogeneous effect. Whereas the OLS estimates the
conditional mean of the new entrant’s performance
across predictor variables, the regression quantiles
estimate the conditional quantiles of the response
variable. The higher quantiles represent the performance
of a higher skill level. We run the regression quantiles
for the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and the 90th percentiles of
the distribution and find the positive effect of shared
solutions is stronger on low-performance distribution
than on high-performance distribution, which supports
our H1b.

As shown in Table 2, the lagged number of shared
solutions is positively related to the teams’ firstsubmission performance in the private leaderboard,
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Table 3 the Impact of Solution Sharing on New Entrants’ Average Performance (Regression Quantile)
Model
Outcome Variable (quantile):

(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑁𝐸𝑗𝑡
q10
q30
q50
q70
q90
0.118** 0.105*** 0.0963*** 0.0891*** 0.0797**
ln(𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 + 1)
(0.0564) (0.0339)
(0.0235)
(0.0225)
(0.0330)
0.0573
ln(𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 + 1) 0.194** 0.148*** 0.117*** 0.0911***
(0.0883) (0.0530)
(0.0368)
(0.0353)
(0.0517)
-0.258
-0.433*** -0.547*** -0.645*** -0.773***
ln(𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑗𝑡 + 1)
(0.181)
(0.109)
(0.0754)
(0.0723)
(0.106)
log_AvgRankPercentile_Sub -1.389*** -1.234*** -1.132*** -1.045*** -0.932***
(0.249)
(0.149)
(0.104)
(0.0995)
(0.146)
-0.229
-0.0450
0.0754
0.179**
0.313***
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡
(0.182)
(0.109)
(0.0760)
(0.0729)
(0.107)
Observations
10,104
10,104
10,104
10,104
10,104
Contest FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.2. Impact of Solution Sharing on Teams’
Subsequent Performance
Even though contestants can observe all the shared
solutions, they may not choose to use all the solutions
given their limited cognitive ability. Therefore, we
operationalize ‘exposure to the shared solutions’ as ‘the
number of votes given to shared solutions.’ Giving votes
to solutions that contestants think is useful is a social
norm in Kaggle, and Kaggle encourages all contestants
to follow this norm. The voted solutions are more likely
to be exploited by contestants.
The solution voting behavior happens at the
contestant level, but the performance is measured at the
team level. Leveraging the single-member teams can
help us avoid the level mismatch issue. Therefore, we
conduct a single-member-team week level analysis. In
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 =

Kaggle competition, most teams are single-member
teams, as indicated by the average team size 1.028.
Focusing on the single-member teams does not hinder
the generalizability of our results. As a robustness check
of our contestant-level exposure measurement, we
operationalize ‘exposure to the shared solutions’ using
‘the number of shared solutions,’ and the results are
consistent.
We organize our data at a weekly level because
most of the contestants update their submission entries
on a weekly base. In our time window of analysis, each
contestant submits 1.2 entries per week on average. The
dependent variable is the normalized average
performance of the single-member team 𝑖 in contest 𝑗 at
week 𝑡. We use Equation 3 to calculate the normalized
average daily performance scores of each singlemember team (i.e., a contestant at a contest) at a
different time:

𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 −𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖=1…𝐼,𝑗,𝑡=1…𝑇 )
𝜎𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒

We use Equation 4 as the model specification to test
our H2. In the analysis, we control for the team fixed
effects to account for the team-specific factors,
including the team’s capability. We also account for the
teams’ effort level through controlling for the lagged
number of submissions and the lagged performance in
the public leaderboard during the contest [33]. We
present the definition and the summary statistics of the
variables in Table 4.

× 1(𝑗)

(3)

𝑖=1…𝐼,𝑗,𝑡=1…𝑇

As shown in Table 5, our results indicate a positive
relationship between exposure to shared solutions and
the team’s performance. The lagged performance
negatively moderates this positive relationship, which
supports our H2a and H2b. Exposure to one more
solution increases the team’s standardized performance
by 0.6%.

Table 4 Variables Used to Test H2 (Single-Member-Team-level Analysis)
Dependent Variable
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡

The normalized average score of single-member team 𝑖 in
contest j at week t in the public leaderboard (only used in the
robustness check).
The normalized average score of single-member team 𝑖 in
contest j at week t in the private leaderboard.

N
2539178

mean
-0.146

sd
1.173

min
-104.6

max
39.46

2539178

-0.133

1.188

-109.8

12.01
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𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡
Variable of Interest
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
Control Variables
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
SubmissionNum𝑖𝑗(𝑡−1)
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡

The number of code submissions by single-member team 𝑖 in
contest 𝑗 at week 𝑡.

2539178

1.198

23.28

0

11563

The number of votes given by single-member team 𝑖 to the
shared solutions in contest 𝑗 at week 𝑡 − 1.

2539178

0.0411

0.402

0

113

The number of comments given by single-member team 𝑖 to
the shared solutions in contest 𝑗 at week 𝑡 − 1.
The number of solution submissions by single-member team
𝑖 in contest 𝑗 at week 𝑡 − 1.
The percentage of contest (𝑗) time elapsed as of current week
t for single-member team 𝑖

2539178

0.00805

0.141

0

31

2539178

0.542

0.289

0.00990

1

𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1 × 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ×
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗(𝑡−1) + 𝛽3 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 +
𝛽4 × 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡 (4)
Table 5 the Impact of Solution Sharing on Teams’
Performance
Model
DV
𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡−1

(1)
(2)
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡
0.00643***

0.0167***

(0.00113)

(0.00376)
-0.0720***

𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 ×
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡−1
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑗(𝑡−1)

6.97e-05

(0.00933)
0.671***

𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡−1

(9.30e-05)
0.669***

(0.0165)
7.69e-05

𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡

(0.0165)
0.0269***

(9.37e-05)
0.0282***

(0.00285)

(0.00283)
-0.0510***
(0.00339)
2,326,971
0.425
208,197
YES

Constant
Observations
R-squared
Number of Teams
Team FE

2,326,971
0.424
208,197
YES

Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1;

4.3. Solution Sharing Has Competing Effects
on Best Solutions
We employ the panel VAR (e.g., [27]) approach to
account for the bilateral effect between the performance
of the best solutions and the team number, while
controlling for contest-specific heterogeneity. Panel
VAR technique combines the traditional VAR
approach, which treats all variables as endogenous
variables, and the panel-data approach, which can
control panel-specific heterogeneity. Therefore, Panel
VAR models allow us to account for the bilateral effect
and control the unobserved contest-specific
heterogeneity. We specify our models as follows:
𝑌𝑗𝑡 = Γ𝑌𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝑒𝑗𝑡

Where
𝑌𝑗𝑡
is
a
four-variable
vector
{ln(𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1), ln(𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 +
1), ln(𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1) × ln(𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1),
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡 (𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗 )} . The
crowd’s best performance measurement is the highest
score of all teams until a given week. We organize our
contest panel data for the panel VAR analysis at the
contest-week level.
Kaggle has two different contest formats, including
the simple competition and two-stage competition
format. As for two-stage competitions, Meta Kaggle
does not provide teams’ performance on the first stage.
Therefore, we only include 91 simple competitions
launched after Kaggle introduced kernel functionality in
our contest-week level panel VAR analysis. We present
the definition and the summary statistics of the variables
in Panel B of Table 1. The variables of interest include
the number of teams, the number of shared solutions,
and the interaction term between the number of teams
and the number of shared solutions. TeamNum and
KernelNum variables are log-transformed due to the
skewness of the data.
For our panel VAR analysis, we first need to decide
the period of lags in our model. We use the model
selection criteria to help us find out the optimal period
of lags. We calculate the model selectin criteria
measures for first to fifth-order panel VAR using the
first
six
lags
of
{ln(𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 +
1), ln(𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1), ln(𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1) ×
ln(𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1),
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑡 (𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗 )}. Based
on the criteria proposed by Andrews and Lu [28], we
should select the model with the smallest Bayesian
Information Criterion (MBIC), Akaike Information
Criterion (MAIC), and Hannan-Quinn Information
Criterion (MQIC). In general, the first-order panel VAR
is the preferred model since it has the smallest MBIC
and MQIC. We also check the stability condition of the
estimated panel VAR, and we find that all eigenvalues
lie inside the unit circle, which means that the estimate
is stable. Finally, we check the Hansen’s J test, and the
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Hansen’s J statistics are insignificant, which means that
we cannot reject our GMM-style instruments are valid.
The estimation results for our panel VAR model are
shown in Table 6. Our main objective is to examine how
the team number and kernel number jointly influence
the performance of the best solution. The one-period
lagged dependent variables allow us to interpret the
short-term effect more easily. The results indicate that

attracting more teams and encouraging teams to share
more solutions at time t-1 positively affects the best
performance of all teams in the next period. However,
the number of shared solutions negatively moderates the
relationship between the team number and the best
performance of all teams (i.e., the parallel path effect).
These results support our H3a, H3b, and H3c.

Table 6 Panel VAR Estimation for 𝑴𝒂𝒙𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒆𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊𝒋
Independent Variable

ln(𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1)

ln(𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 + 1)

.9363887***
(.0804128)
.394379**
(.1714858)
-.0295421**
(-.0295421)
-.0615889*
(.0324364)

ln(𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 + 1)
ln(𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 + 1)
× ln(𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 + 1)
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗−1

Dependent Variable
ln(𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1)
ln(𝑇𝑒𝑎𝑚𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1)
× ln(𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 + 1)
.0132983
.5886496
(.0517201)
(.7945301)
1.008163***
2.797244
(.1167329)
(1.702409)
-.0103772
.6671285***
(.0089431)
(.1151961)
-.0164572
-.5550865*
(.0321962)
(.335936)

𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑗
.4258699***
(.1504277)
.8511826**
(.3406379)
-.0673906**
(.0279781)
.6563923***
(.1023322)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

5. Discussion and Conclusion
Our studies theoretically proposed and
empirically examined how the contestants with
different skill levels are influenced differently by the
exposure to shared solutions through learning and
fixing effects. Our results suggest that the overall
effects of exposure to shared solutions on the
contestants are favorable in general, but high-skilled
contestants benefit less on average. However, the
effects on the crowd’s best performance are not
necessarily positive. Even though exposure to shared
solutions has a positive main effect on the
performance, it may also discourage parallel path
effects.
This work offers both theoretical and managerial
contributions. Theoretically, our study adds to the
crowdsourcing literature by providing a detailed
analysis of the effect of allowing solution sharing on
different stakeholders in the crowdsourcing contest
platform. Research regarding the effects of exposure
to solutions generated and shared by other solvers in
crowdsourcing contests remains nascent and
underexplored ([29] - [32] are a few exceptions).
Current empirical studies mainly studying this effect
focus more on how different dimensions of a shared
solution (e.g., originality, quality) influence the
contestants’ performance (Ba et al. 2017, Jin 2018)
[31]-[32]. Our study focuses on how contestant’s
quality moderates the effect of exposure to shared
solutions on the performance. We point out that the
sharing may lead to unintended outcomes (e.g.,
reduced parallel path effect).

From the managerial perspective, this work offers
insights for managers who are currently debating the
legality of allowing solution sharing in the
crowdsourcing contest platform for data science tasks.
Even though allowing solution sharing might be
beneficial to the platform, the requesters, and the
contestants on average, managers in the
crowdsourcing contest platforms still need to be
cautious when they make a decision related to
allowing solution sharing because of the existence of
unintended adverse effects. The decision should be
made based on the tradeoff between the benefits (e.g.,
learning effect) and the costs (e.g., fixation effect) of
the solution sharing. For example, if some contests
want to make new contestants familiar with the task
quickly, motivating more shared solutions is the
dominant strategy. However, if some contests already
have attracted a large number of teams from diverse
backgrounds, discouraging solution sharing (at least
the low-quality solutions) might be the dominant
strategy, given shared solutions may inhibit the
parallel path effect.
Several future extensions are possible. In this
study, we could not observe how and to what extent
contestants used the shared solutions based on our
data, so we use voting behavior as a proxy for the
exposure to the shared solutions. Future studies
focusing on the effects of exposure to shared solutions
in the crowdsourcing contest may want to measure
solution usage more directly with the proper private
dataset (e.g., the log data). For instance, with the log
data, scholars can measure how much time contestants
spent on exploiting each existing solution and how
much effort contestants spend. Second, we only
examined the effect of solution sharing for the data-
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science related tasks. Future studies can also examine
the impact on other types of crowdsourcing tasks,
including the tasks evaluated by the subjective criteria
(e.g., the logo design tasks and web development
tasks). Third, even though we examined how
contestants’ skill level moderates the effect of shared
solutions, future studies can focus more on how the
types (e.g., educational purpose versus solution
leaking purpose) and the quality (e.g., high- versus
low-quality) of shared solutions moderate the effect.
Forth, although we use the fixed effects as our main
identification strategies to examine how exposure to
shared solutions influences contestants’ performance
(a common identification strategy used for the online
crow platform studies, e.g., [33]-[34]), it is still
interesting to test the predictive power of these shared
solutions using machine learning techniques.

Appendix. Robustness Check
A1. An Alternative Measurement of Team
Performance
For our H1, we use the best daily performance
instead of average daily performance to measure the
new entrant teams’ performance. The results are
highly consistent.
For our H1, H2 and H3, we use the performance
in the private leaderboard as the measurement of
teams’ performance. As a robustness check, we use the
performance in the public leaderboard as the
measurement of teams’ performance. All results using
alternative measurements are consistent.

A2. Heteroscedasticity-based Instrument
To examine whether the shared solutions help
new entrant teams to achieve better performance at
their first submissions (i.e., our H1a), we use the
mathematically generated instrumental variables to
test the robustness of our OLS estimates. We construct
the orthogonal instruments mathematically using the
method proposed by Lewbel [35]. Lewbel’s method
treats all covariates as exogenous and constructs
orthogonal instruments mathematically from these
covariates (e.g., [36]). In our model, we treat the
quality of new entrants and duration elapsed as
exogenous variables to construct instruments for our
endogenous term (i.e., the shared solutions number at
time t-1). We implement this method using xtivreg2h
command in STATA, and we account for the contestspecific fixed effects using the fe option. The highly
consistent results indicate that the specific instruments
we chose do not drive our 2SLS results.

Table 7 the Impact of Solution Sharing on New Entrant
Teams’ Performance (Lewbel type IV)
Model
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
DV
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
𝑗𝑡
𝑗𝑡
𝑗𝑡
𝑗𝑡
Estimator
Generated IVs
ln(
0.137***
0.144***
0.252***
0.247***
𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡−1 +
1)
(0.0402)
(0.0403)
(0.0386)
(0.0388)
-0.414***
-0.490***
ln(𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑗𝑡
+ 1)
(0.0747)
(0.0751)
ln(
-1.223*** -1.168*** -0.940*** -0.923***
𝐴𝑣𝑔𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑡 +
1)
(0.101)
(0.104)
(0.0934)
(0.0954)
0.266***
0.238***
0.702***
0.622***
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑗𝑡
(0.0619)
(0.0620)
(0.0542)
(0.0544)
Observatio
10,227
10,104
10,399
10,310
ns
R-squared
0.041
0.039
0.150
0.127
Contest FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
Kleibergen
99.312
102.018
103.390
103.059
-Paap rk
LM
statistic
Cragg1252.981
1303.022
1232.760
1220.444
Donald
Wald F
statistic
Hansen J
0.912
3.080
4.626
3.035
statistic
P-value for
0.6339
0.2144
0.0990
0.2192
Hansen J
statistic
Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1

A3. Alternative Measurement of Exposure to
Shared Solutions at the Team Level
For our team-level analysis, we use the solution
voting behavior to measure contestants’ exposure to
shared solutions. Even though it is the platform norm
for contestants to give votes to the shared solutions
they used, it is still possible that some contestants used
the shared solutions without voting. To mitigate this
concern, we use the number of shared solutions
available in the last period to measure the team’s
exposure to shared solutions. We use this contest-level
measurement as a robustness check for our H2, and our
results are highly consistent.
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